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Abstract 
This paper revisits the traditional ‘circular flow’ of the macroeconomy (Samuelson, 1948) and reworks 
it to capture the use of big data and artificial intelligence in the economy. The characterisation builds 
on the multifaceted role of data to conceptualise markets and differentiate them depending on whether 
data is an output, a means of payment, or an input in knowledge extraction processes. After this, the 
main differences between the circular flow economy and the data economy are described, identifying 
the new flows and agents and the circular flow assumptions that do not seem to be as relevant to the 
workings of the data economy. The result is a ‘semicircular’ flow diagram: unprocessed data flow 
from individuals, families, and firms to data holders. Only data processed in the form of digital 
services flows back to families and firms. The new model is used to explore the potential for market 
failures. Knowledge extraction to generate digital services occurs within a ‘black box’ that displays 
natural monopoly characteristics. Data holders operate simultaneously in the markets for data 
generation and knowledge extraction. They generate the amount of knowledge that maximises their 
profit. This creates data underutilisation and asymmetries between data holders and other agents in the 
economy such as anti-trust authorities, central banks, scientific communities, consumers, and firms. 
Public intervention should facilitate additional generation of knowledge by developing additional 
merit and non-rival uses of data in such a way that knowledge generation maximises the social gain 
from digitalisation. The semicircular model can incorporate data leakages and knowledge injections 
activated by data taxation. Data taxes should be paid with data respecting existing legislation, privacy 
concerns, and preserve the incentives of the data holder to innovate in competitive data generation 
markets. A centralised data authority, as initially proposed by Martens (2016) and more recently by 
Scott Morton et al. (2019), would be responsible for knowledge generation and aim to achieve better 
regulation, standards, and transparency, and maximise common good. Our conclusions are in line with 
an extensive user-centric approach to data portability (De Hert et al., 2018). This paper contributes to 
the digital economy discussion by developing a simple theoretical motivation for increased access to 
data for the public good, which will stimulate further theoretical and empirical exercises and lead to 
policy actions. 
Keywords: big data, artificial intelligence, macroeconomy 
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1. Introduction 
For several years many journalists and researchers have claimed that the drastic reduction in the cost 
of collecting, storing, analysing, and obtaining valuable knowledge from diverse data sources has 
changed the way the economy works. In this view, markets are more and more driven by big data 
(BD) and artificial intelligence (AI) and by their interaction. Although there is an increasing number of 
conceptual and normative analyses of the digital economy (Codagnone and Martens, 2016), the 
standard circular flow model of the macroeconomy that conditions the way that many policymakers 
think about the economy at large has no explicit role for data (Duch-Brown et al., 2017). As far as we 
know there have been no attempts to revamp the circular flow model of the economy to take the role 
data plays in the economy into account. 
Some authors and thinkers have gone so far as to suggest that a world of advanced AI and BD 
techniques will lead to the ‘end of theory’ (Anderson, 2008; Kitchin, 2014, Couper 2013) as all 
‘solutions’ can be analysed from a reductive process of feeding huge data sets into self-optimising but 
‘theory-free’ AI algorithms (Silver et al., 2017). AI and BD are certainly already challenging 
epistemologies across the social sciences and seem set to do so to an ever greater extent in the future. 
However, for as long as economic policymaking continues to pass through human-led decision-
making processes and ‘filters’, economic theory will continue to provide a powerful conceptual 
framework for thinking through policymaking and regulatory decisions. In this context, the circular 
flow of the economy is the simplest macroeconomic model. It has traditionally been used to teach how 
the market economy determines optimal production (Samuelsson, 1948; Samuelsson and Nordhaus, 
2010) through the interaction of households, firms, and governments in factor and product markets. It 
helps students to understand the functioning of the ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, 1778) and the failures that 
justify government intervention in the economy. This paper considers how the traditional circular flow 
model of the economy might be adapted to the ‘data economy’ by examining the extent to which the 
main underlying assumptions continue to hold in a data economy in which BD and AI techniques have 
superseded the ‘pin factory’ (Smith, 1778) model of production. Both similarities and differences are 
therefore identified to develop a new version to illustrate potential market failures and how 
government intervention might evolve in a BD- and AI-driven data economy. 
The new model was constructed by taking the following differences into account. 
Firstly, traditional economy flows of services, tangible goods, factors of production, and 
money can be synthesised in terms of factor and product markets. Incorporating BD flows and the use 
of AI to extract knowledge from data blurs this distinction. The main reason is that data plays a 
multifaceted role in the economy. Sometimes data is an implicit means of payment that consumers 
use to pay for digital services (Facebook, for example). Sometimes data is an explicit output of 
consumption processes that data holders collect (such as credit card spending data),and sometimes 
data is a factor of production in itself, acting as an input for the knowledge extraction process out of 
which digital services are created (such as marketing companies targeting consumers or insurance 
companies using BD and AI techniques to price their policies). 
Secondly, although data is a means of payment, ‘atomistic’ data points are difficult to price in 
isolation. The value of data is therefore unclear, which in turn makes the price formation process of 
payments in the data economy obscure. Indeed, one atomistic data point that an individual uses for a 
specific payment may, in isolation, have no value for BD and AI approaches. However, if that 
atomistic data point is included in a linked data set that covers a range of aspects of an individual’s 
life, its value changes. Furthermore, if that set of individual data is part of a fully searchable and 
integrated data ‘lake’ covering a vast number of atomistic individuals, then the value is quite different 
again. This ‘contextual’ value of data is something that is not explicitly dealt with in the standard 
circular model, which assumes explicit price formation for inputs and outputs. In contrast, data pricing 
in the data economy is very often ‘opaque’ and ‘contextual’. 
Thirdly, only large data aggregators with large computing machines can capture the positive 
externalities from data aggregation. The production function of data collection and processing 
therefore displays economies of scale and scope (Scott Morton et al., 2019), setting data holders in a 
race towards N = All and X = Everything. The point at which diminishing returns to scale arrive in BD 
and AI knowledge generation processes is an unresolved empirical question, but if the marginal cost of 
an additional unit of data storage is assumed to be zero and the (potential) added value of an additional 
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data point is (potentially) positive at the margin, then the theoretical implication is that the point of 
diminishing returns is never reached. In other words, the bigger the data lake, the more efficient the 
data processor in question is (Blake et al., 2014). Notably, if it is assumed for the sake of argument 
that AI and BD technology is common to all firms, then the size of the data lake held by a given firm 
is what constitutes its core competitive advantage. Network effects and sunk costs reinforce the natural 
monopoly characteristics of knowledge extraction. 
Fourthly, the resulting flows of economic interactions are circular in the sense that atomistic 
individuals, such as citizens and firms, generate data (which is used by data holders) and receive 
services as part of the exchange. However, the model is semicircular in the sense that direct data 
flows of unprocessed data are unidirectional from citizens and firms to data holders but not from data 
holders to citizens, firms, or governments. Data flows from data holders to other agents in the 
economy include a wide range of taxonomies but are only indirect in the sense that they are processed 
in the form of customised goods or services (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2018; Bergemann et al., 2018). 
For example, consumers trade their primary personal data in return for a data-driven service on 
Google’s search engine or on Facebook. What flows back to consumers is non-monetised consumer 
surplus but not data. There is no way to ‘trace’ the way in which BD and AI techniques make use of 
individual data points. This semicircularity and lack of traceability is an additional difference from the 
explicit and traceable flows of capital and labour in the standard circular flow approach. This makes 
the semicircular flow similar to creative processes that are elusive to patent and copyright regulations, 
thereby ‘de facto’ generating an insufficiently transparent situation. 
Fifth, data property rights are often unclear in practice (1). From an economic point of view, 
data holders are ‘de facto’ owners of a great many large data sets. However, theoretical categorisation 
of the data as public, private, club, and/or merit goods is not clear and may depend on the specific use 
of the data in question. The current de facto ownership constrains alternative merit and non-rival uses 
of data that could increase knowledge and social well-being without damaging privacy and the 
interests of data holders. Optimum degrees and forms of data sharing or access are yet to be defined 
(OECD, 2015; Palfrey and Gasser, 2012; Scott Morton et al., 2019). Scale- and scope-driven 
centralisation and underutilisation generates information asymmetries between data holders and other 
agents in the economy such as consumers, other firms, regulatory authorities, and the scientific 
community. De facto ownership operates as a ‘breastplate’, a shell that allows generation of 
knowledge from data within an AI ‘black box’. This only allows uses of data that maximise the data 
collection of data holders and their profit. It benefits society because it protects the investments of data 
holders and their incentives to keep on innovating so that AI expands to cover more human activities 
(towards X = All). It also bears an opportunity cost for the whole of society as additional alternative 
merit and non-rival uses of data could generate large social gains and further innovation. 
The first difference is composed of the starting point for conceptualising markets in which 
data play a prominent role and differentiate between them according to the role that data plays. On the 
one hand, there are pure and mixed data production markets in which implicit prices are paid using 
data. Data in these markets is produced/generated as an explicit output. On the other hand, knowledge 
extraction markets are markets where data is an input. Markets where data play different roles do not 
necessarily have the same structure. Incorporating these new markets implies the incorporation of a 
new type of actor/stakeholder: data holders. In practice, data holders (European Commission, 2018a; 
European Union, 2016 (2)) are very often digital giants such as Facebook or Google that operate 
businesses of this type on a vast scale. Data holders are the de facto owners of data (Duch-Brown et 
al., 2017). Data protection legislation is developing rapidly around the world. The EU’s general data 
protection regulation (GDPR), (European Commission, 2016), which came into force in 2018 is a 
                                           
(1) The EU’s general data protection regulation has greatly improved personal data protection and has certainly reduced levels of 
improper use of personal data. Nonetheless, within given purpose limitations, firms remain able to make profitable use of integrated 
data sets comprising data points that may atomistically be considered ‘personal’. 
(2) The GDPR (European Commission, 2016) refers to ‘data controllers’ and ‘data processors’. According to Art. 4, a ‘controller’ is a 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union law or the law in a 
Member State, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Members State law. A 
‘processor’ is a natural or legal person, public authority, agency, or other body that processes personal data on behalf of the controller. 
Many data processors are also data controllers. Data holders are referred to with the aim of conceptualising an economic agent, as 
explained in the text. 
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global benchmark. This paper assumes that — in practice — data holders exist and are able to amass 
data lakes of varying sizes, to which AI and BD techniques are then applied to provide value-added 
services to the economy. They operate as de facto owners of data (Duch-Brown et al., 2017) in a 
manner that should be fully compliant with existing regulations. However, their activities very often 
occur in a black box (European Commission, 2018a) which questions the need for clearer and more 
precise allocation of rights over data (Dosis and Sand-Zantman, 2018) and probably additional 
regulations (De Hert et al., 2018). 
The semicircular model presented in this paper improves understanding of the interaction of 
households, firms, data holders, and governments in data production, knowledge extraction, factor and 
product markets, and the failures that justify government intervention in the economy, and to propose 
future research lines and policy actions required for optimal knowledge generation. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the traditional circular flow of the 
economy model and its equilibrium. Section 3 develops the semicircular flow of the economy 
framework by defining data production markets and knowledge extraction markets and identifying the 
circular flow assumptions that fail in this new model. Section 4 goes deeper into the market failures 
that characterise knowledge extraction and the economic characterisation of data. Section 5 reviews 
the information asymmetries that knowledge extraction accompanied by de facto ownership generates, 
and which leads to the semicircular nature of the digital economy. Section 6 focuses on the policy 
actions motivated and stimulated by the semicircular characterisation of the data economy. Finally, 
Section 7 draws conclusions and suggests directions future research might take. 
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2. The circular flow of the economy 
 
The diagram of the circular flow of the economy below represents the major exchanges in the 
economy (Samuelsson and Nordhaus, 2010). There are factor markets and product markets. In factor 
markets individuals provide labour (input) and, in exchange, businesses provide individuals with 
wages (income). Firms also spend on other factors of production such as capital and raw materials, and 
transfer income to the factor owners. In product markets individuals buy the goods and services that 
businesses produce. Factors of production enable businesses to produce goods and services (output) 
and income allows the owners of factors and workers to buy goods and services. Money is the means 
of payment that everybody accepts and is used to measure economic value. 
Figure 1. The circular flow of the economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 1, flows and their direction are represented by black arrows. The expenditure of 
sellers (employers/firms) becomes income for buyers (workers/households) and vice versa. In this 
simple, theoretical model, aggregate expenditure of an economy is identical to aggregate income. The 
economy is characterised by specialisation and use of capital, which make labour more productive 
and allow a network of trade to develop and extensive use of money. Economic activities are 
coordinated by the market without government intervention. In every market there are two sets of 
agents, buyers and sellers, who interact in exchanges which determine prices and quantities of goods, 
services, and assets. No overall organisation is responsible for production, consumption, distribution, 
or pricing. Explicit prices play a central role in balancing supply and demand in each individual factor 
and product market. They serve as signals to producers and consumers and coordinate their decisions. 
Before any exchange, agents will incur search costs to find their match; there is no 
centralised specific agent responsible for matching efficiency that gathers information from both 
sides and centralises decisions about the best matches (3). 
                                           
(3) In most markets there is a place where agents meet: in housing markets through a real estate agent, in shares markets through the stock 
market, and those looking for a partner through dating agencies. Marketplaces speed up the rate at which traders find each other and 
match (Coles and Smith, 1996). In macroeconomic models the matching process is traditionally captured by a Cobb-Douglas matching 
function such as: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑀𝑠) = log(𝜆𝑠) + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑠) + 𝛽2log(𝑆𝑠) 
 
Households Firms 
Inputs: labour, land, capital goods 
SUPPLY 
Prices of factors: wages, rents, 
interest 
DEMAND 
Outputs: goods and services  
SUPPLY 
Prices of product markets 
DEMAND 
Factor market 
Product market 
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More complex circular models incorporate imperfections that exist in the real world which can 
lead to unemployment, financial crisis, monopolies, negative externalities such as pollution, or 
ethically unacceptable income distribution, and extreme poverty. Governments then have a role in 
seeking to ‘correct’ these failures by aiming to increase efficiency, promote equity, and foster 
macroeconomic stability and growth (4). Markets are not efficient when there is no perfect 
competition as in the case of monopolies, externalities, or public goods. Markets are efficient in the 
case of private goods. Monopolies lead to lower output, moving the economy inside the production 
possibility frontier and increasing prices, which motivates government intervention to break them up. 
Merit goods with positive externalities such as education are very often financed by governments. 
Whenever market outcomes result in an unfair distribution of wealth, the state may develop 
redistribution policies, and when the economic cycle goes through periods of low economic activity, 
the state may seek to stimulate the economy by means of fiscal and/or monetary policies. 
Figure 2 augments the circular flow of the economy to include leakages and injections. Agents 
can withdraw or inject money from the circular flow of an economy. Leakages (red arrows) and 
injections (blue arrows) occur in the financial, government, and overseas sectors. Financial institutions 
or capital markets play the role of intermediaries providing the option to withdraw money from the 
flow by saving (S) money or to inject investment (I) by borrowing money. The financial system is also 
a circulatory system of funds in which, technically speaking, lending from savers is equal to the 
borrowing from investors. Financial assets and instruments are denominated in money. Central banks 
set interest rates that are the price of borrowing money. Taxes (T) are a leakage from households and 
firms to the government sector that makes government activities financially feasible. Government 
activities, subsidies, welfare transfers to the community, and purchases of goods and services provide 
injections (G). Government obtains revenues to promote efficiency, equality, stability, and law 
enforcement from taxes. Taxes are like the price of public goods with the difference that private 
consumption is voluntary while taxes are not. Governments exercise their monopoly of power to 
collect taxes. Flows of goods, services, and finance occur across national borders. Overseas economic 
relationships make it possible to import (M) from the rest of the world, which represents a leakage to 
other economies, and export (X), which injects income from overseas. International law and 
international institutions regulate international relationships such as trade. 
The state of (macro) economic equilibrium occurs when total leakages (savings (S) + taxes 
(T) + imports (M)) are equal to the total injections (investment (I) + government spending 
(G) + exports (X)) that occur in the economy. This can be represented by: 
S + T + M = I + G + X (1) 
Disequilibrium occurs when leakages are not equal to the total injections. In such a situation, 
changes in expenditure and output will lead the economy back to the state of equilibrium. Such 
changes will depend on the type of inequality: 
                                                                                                                                    
 where the number of successful matches (𝑀𝑠) in markets is explained by the number of buyers (𝐵𝑠) and sellers (𝑆𝑠) in that market and 
𝜆𝑠, the efficiency of the matching process between them. When variables such as geographical location and other characteristics of 
goods and services match those demanded by buyers, λ is higher, and the matching process is more efficient. It is also determined by 
buyers’ and sellers’ search efforts that may be channelled by contacting specific agencies, but there is no centralised agent in charge of 
matching efficiency. 
(4) Efficiency of perfect competition implies that markets will produce the goods and services most desired by consumers, using the most 
efficient techniques and the minimum amount of inputs given the production possibility frontier (PPF). There is no perfect competition 
in the case of monopoly elements, externalities, or public goods. In the case of monopoly, a seller is able to affect the market price 
leading to higher prices and lower output moving the economy inside the PPF. Governments regulate monopolies and introduce anti-
trust laws to prohibit actions such a price fixing or open markets to competitors. Externalities occur when cost or benefits are imposed 
on third parties not participating in the market. Government regulations are designed to control negative and promote positive 
externalities. Pollution is an example of a negative externality, while the spillover from research and development to the whole society 
is a positive one. Cases of positive externalities are public goods such as national defence, and merit goods such as education and 
health. They are often financed by governments because private incentives for their production do not always exist, and several 
problems may arise if they are not efficiently provided. Markets may function efficiently but produce an unfair distribution of income. 
Income inequality may be ethically unacceptable and voters may decide to change the government. Governments can reduce income 
inequality by progressive taxation, transfer payments, or by providing basic necessities such as education and health care. In addition, 
capitalism has always suffered periods of instability, fluctuations, business cycles, and periods of inflation or high unemployment. 
Governments can affect output, employment, and prices by means of fiscal and monetary policies and build a social safety net for the 
elderly, unemployed, and impoverished people. It is clear that an efficient human society requires both markets and governments. 
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S + T + M > I + G + X (2) 
or 
S + T + M < I + G + X (3) 
In equation 2, if the sum of savings (S) plus taxes (T) and imports (M) is greater than the sum 
of investment (I) plus government spending (G) and exports (X), income, output, and expenditure will 
fall, contracting economic activity. Families’ incomes will be lower, which will reduce their savings, 
the income they spend on imports, and the taxes they pay. This will lead to a reduction in the left-hand 
part of the equation until the economy is back in equilibrium (equation 1). Governments can accelerate 
the process to achieving equilibrium by increasing government expenditure. They can, for example, 
alleviate the reduction in family income by transferring rents through unemployment benefits or 
subsidies. 
In equation 3, if the sum of savings (S) plus taxes (T) and imports (M) is smaller than the sum 
of investment (I) plus government spending (G) and exports (X), income, output, and expenditure will 
rise, expanding the economy. As families’ incomes increase so do their savings, their expenditure on 
imports, and the taxes they pay, leading the economy back to equilibrium (equation 1). Equilibrium 
can also be explained from the micro-economic perspective as a result of consumers maximising their 
utility, producers maximising their profits, and a decentralised matching process. 
Figure 2. The circular flow of the economy, leakages, and injections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Households Firms 
Resources/labour (input) 
Income (wages) 
Goods and services (output) 
Expenditure  
Financial sector 
Savings (S) and investments (I) 
 
Government sector 
Taxation (T) and government spending (G)  
 
Overseas sector 
Imports (M) and exports (X) 
 
Injection 
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3. New markets, new flows, new agents, and new assumptions 
The presence of BD and AI brings new flows, new markets, and new stakeholders and the need to 
revise some of the above assumptions and find a new way of representing the major exchanges in the 
economy. 
Based on the role played by data, three new markets can be identified. On the one hand, pure 
data production markets and mixed data production markets are substantially different from 
traditional factor and product markets but increasingly interconnected and operating in both of them 
and affecting the entire economy (Arthur, 2011; Codagnone and Martens, 2016). Their main 
characteristic is that consumer activities in both markets generate BD. As a result, a new type of 
stakeholder emerges: data holders (European Commission, 2018a; European Union, 2016). Data 
holders are profit maximisation companies that specialise in collecting data in pure and mixed data 
production markets, obtaining de facto ownership (Duch-Brown et al., 2017), processing the data 
(Dosis and Sand-Zantman, 2018), and re-selling after processing in the form of customised goods or 
services (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2018; Bergemann et al., 2018) to either other firms or consumers. 
They include businesses such as social networks, search engines, network operating systems, e-
commerce, or sharing (Scott Morton et al., 2019). Data holders accept data as an implicit payment for 
the provision of services in data generation markets where their activity is very often not profitable in 
monetary terms (Bond and Bullock, 2019; Kaminska, 2016; McArdle, 2019). They extract profitable 
knowledge and information from data by operating in the BD knowledge extraction markets where 
they can monetise BD (Scott Morton et al., 2019). In this paper the term data holders only refers to 
private companies. There are also huge data lakes in the public domain that may currently be 
underutilised such as tax records and the health data system, which also have the potential to be used 
as BD and AI data lakes for creating value-added analytical services. This section conceptualises and 
characterises pure and mixed data production markets and BD knowledge extraction markets and 
incorporates them in a new version of the circular flow of the economy: the semicircular flow of the 
data economy because of the one-directional flow of unprocessed data from households and firms to 
data holders. It reviews the assumptions of the circular flow of the economy, which fail in the resulting 
semicircular flow model. 
Pure and mixed data production markets 
 
Pure data production markets are barter markets in which no explicit medium of exchange such as 
money is used (Evans, 2013; Scott Morton et al., 2019; Tett, 2018). Data holders provide ‘digital 
services’ that are the result of knowledge extracted from BD using AI techniques. Consumer payment 
in return for that service is made using the data and only the data that they generate while using those 
digital services. This is the case for search engines such as Google and social networks such as 
Facebook. This is also the case for LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Spotify in their ‘freemium’ basic versions 
(Kramer and Kalka, 2016) (5). Figure 3 shows these flows of exchange of digital services for data 
using green arrows. These companies are data holders that do not obtain a direct monetary 
compensation from this activity but an implicit price in data. There would be no incentive to invest in 
these services if it were not for two things: first, at least de facto data processor (service provider) 
ownership of data, and, second, another market where data holders can monetise the data (Dosis and 
Sand-Zantman, 2018; Jones and Tonetti, 2018, Scott Morton et al., 2019) and therefore obtain a 
revenue stream from them. 
Non-monetary prices, or implicit data prices, change the theoretical representation of supply 
and demand in the price and quantity space and in the calculation of consumer surpluses (Brynjolfsson 
et al., 2018). Data does not have a clear value, especially for consumers who have very little idea of 
the data being collected (Scott Morton et al., 2019), which blurs and dilutes utility maximisation and 
the calculation of the demand graph and its slope. 
                                           
(5) For example, Facebook offers a ‘free to use’ digital service that allows people to stay in touch. Users generate data when they create a 
user profile indicating their name, occupation, schools attended. and when adding other users as ‘friends’, exchanging messages, 
statuses, pictures, videos, links, ‘likes’, and other Facebook reactions together with the exhausted data (paradata, environmental data, 
or footprints) related to their activity. Other examples are Instagram, a photograph- and video-sharing service, or WhatsApp, a 
messaging service, which are free to use and do not generate direct revenue but do generate data. 
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Figure 3. Pure data production markets and the circular flow of the economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed data production markets are those in which data holders obtain two rewards in return 
for their service. Firstly, as in pure data production markets, they collect the data generated by users. 
Secondly, they receive payment in the traditional way as an additional compensation. This is the case 
of LinkedIn, Dropbox, and Spotify in their ‘premium’ upgraded versions (Kramer and Kalka, 2016). 
This is also the case of multi-sided markets and platforms in the sharing economy such as Uber or 
Airbnb in which consumers pay a service fee. In these platforms, data holders offer search cost 
reduction services facilitating supply and demand matching after extracting knowledge and 
information from data. 
Figure 4 represents these flows of exchanges using dotted green and black arrows. The arrows 
are green because there is a two-directional exchange similar to that of pure data production markets: 
citizens receive a digital service and, while using it, they pay part of the price by generating valuable 
data about their experiences and behaviour. The black arrows indicate that, as in the traditional product 
markets, there is a flow of offline goods and/or digital services in one direction and monetary 
expenditure in return for it in the other direction. 
Figure 4. Mixed data production markets and the circular flow of the economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many online platforms facilitate matching between households that are willing to share their 
assets such as houses or cars while idle or while not being fully used (Airbnb, Couchsurfing, Zipcar, 
Uber, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, Turo — formerly RelayRides — Getaround, etc.), to recirculate goods (eBay, 
Etsy, Freecycle, Freegive, Yerdle, SwapStyle, etc.) or even offer services and labour (TaskRabbit, 
myTaskAngel, Freelancers, etc.) or just to build social connections (Codagnone and Martens, 2016). 
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Processing of BD by means of AI facilitates matching between households. This ‘sharing’ of goods 
and services for a monetary payment or for free, and flows of goods and monetary payments from 
household to household, is represented by two black arrows. The arrows are black because, although 
the exchange takes place between families (consumer to consumer, or C2C), it represents the same 
flow of goods and services that happens in traditional markets. There is not a green flow of data from 
household to household because participants receive information and knowledge on only a limited set 
of offers that result from search rankings or matching algorithms. Although there are no data flows 
from household to household, thanks to reductions in search costs, households can supply goods and 
services previously provided by private specialised firms. These peer to peer (P2P) or sharing flows 
also occur from firm to firm. Similarly, search frictions between firms (business to business, or B2B) 
and between firms and consumers (business to consumer, or B2C) can be reduced to benefit both sides 
of the market or the interests of data holders. 
Data flow in pure and mixed data production markets is one directional, semicircular, and 
from households and firms to data holders. Both pure and mixed data production markets are at the 
same time consumption markets and production processes. On the one hand, there is an exchange 
and, on the other, there is a data production process about consumer (and firm) activity and behaviour. 
Both markets have a data flow from households (and firms) to data holders and a flow of ‘algorithmic’ 
services such as matching algorithms or search rankings from data holders to households and firms. 
Both markets are data holder data factories in which they produce feedstocks that are used to improve 
existing services and AI and to develop and power other services. More and more devices contain 
sensors and more activities operate in the same way as these two markets, generating data as part of 
the payment. The economy is characterised by increasing capacity to pump zettabytes of unstructured 
data to data holders (Economist, 2017), who as owners of data factories, obtain de facto ownership of 
data. 
Big data knowledge extraction markets 
Data holders accept payment in data because they are able to generate revenue streams from them in 
the BD knowledge extraction markets. Data in these markets is processed, refined, valued, 
purchased, sold, exchanged, or merged for the purpose of maximising revenue streams, generating and 
collecting additional data, and improving AI. Knowledge extraction markets operate as if in a black 
box in which BD is the feedstock of a process producing knowledge, information, insights, patterns, 
predictions, and new services and AI improvement. Search engines and social networks such as 
Facebook and Google operate in pure and mixed data production markets but base most of their 
revenues on advertising and operating as B2C and in B2B intermediaries. Market platforms also 
operate as C2C or B2B data intermediaries. They use personal data to communicate with their 
customers and provide better and more personalised services, make suggestions and advertise to 
market their own products or offer marketing services to other firms. They also use data to train and 
improve algorithms, that is, the more people use a search engine, the better it becomes which allows it 
to generate new AI services such as image and face recognition, translation, or personality assessments 
through social networks. Knowledge extraction from BD is influencing an increasing proportion of the 
economy. Firms from diverse industries are expanding their use of BD and AI to analyse demand. 
Households increasingly adopt technologies that offer tailored recommendations based on their data 
sharing in pure and mixed data production markets. 
Data is not very often traded for money (Economist, 2017) in an explicit fashion. There are 
several disincentives for trading, such as problems in pricing data, legal restrictions, and the definition 
of usage in contracts. According to the GDPR (European Commission, 2016), lawful processing (6) of 
data can be based, for example, on consent (7) that has to be given for each specific and explicit 
purpose (8). BD knowledge extraction markets are characterised by companies that keep in-house data 
generation and usage. As a result, when one company is interested in data from another and in its data 
collection infrastructure, it is likely to buy that company. Bilateral barter deals are also common. The 
data brokerage industry has also emerged and is characterised by lack of transparency (FTC 2014). It 
                                           
(6) European Union (2016), Art. 6. 
(7) European Union (2016), Art. 7. 
(8) European Union (2016), Art. 5.b 
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is composed of unregulated companies that obtain information by scouring web searches, social 
networks, purchase histories, public records, and other sources (Steel, 2013), very often without 
consumers’ permission. According to Bergemann and Bonatti (2018), firms such as Acxiom, Nielsen, 
and Oracle sell information about consumers to advertisers and retailers. 
The semicircular flow of the economy 
Figure 5 takes stock of all of the above to represent the semicircular flow of the economy by 
incorporating new markets, new flows, and new stakeholders. On the left-hand side, households and 
firms continue operating in the circular flow of the economy, exchanging goods and services for 
money and labour for wages. Their daily activity and interactions are increasingly interconnected with 
pure and mixed data, generating a flow of data and payments to data holders. On the right-hand side, 
data holders use BD and AI to extract knowledge and information. In return for monetary and data 
payments, they generate a flow of services that foster aspects of human activity such as sharing of 
assets, services, and labour in very diverse P2P, B2C, and B2B platforms. As profit maximisation 
agents, data holders produce the amount of knowledge that maximises their profits. Their services 
influence markets through matching efficiency, marketing, and advertising, search and transaction 
costs, creating information friction and generating new and innovative services (OECD, 2019). 
 
Figure 5. The semicircular flow of the economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It could be argued that data holders are buyers of data inputs and producers of data-driven 
service outputs, and then fit them into the traditional flow in the box on the left hand side of the 
diagram. Figure 5 shows that separating the two is important for several reasons. Firstly, the BD 
knowledge extraction markets are not only a small addition to factor and product markets. 
“Digitalisation and data flowing is giving shape to the globalisation process and creating a second 
economy that is vast, automatic, and not easily visible and is not a small add-on to the physical 
economy. In two to three decades it will surpass the physical economy in size” (Arthur, 2011) and is 
already able to influence an increasing number of sectors in the economy (Codagnone and Martens 
2016; Codagnone, forthcoming; OECD, 2019; Unctad, 2017). Secondly, it visualises the economy as a 
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two-sided market with an intermediary platform. Indeed, the latest papers on this subject point out the 
implicit new side of markets (Dosis and Sand-Zantman, 2019; Jones and Tonetti, 2018). Thirdly, 
separation helps visualisation of the semicircular nature of the digital economy, the circular flow 
assumptions that are failing, and the digital economy market failures that are studied in the following 
subsection of this paper. Separation based on the role of a factor is also used in this paper to study 
specific aspects of the circular economy. For example, electricity is an output (of the electricity 
industry or of households with solar panels) but also an input (into the production of many goods and 
services). Issues such as concentration in both markets are different and are studied separately. It is 
known that changes in electricity prices affect costs in the whole economy, which makes concentration 
in electricity production markets a relevant economic issue. The influence of data in the economy is 
even more complicated and opaque, which makes the separation relevant and necessary and 
convenient for human understanding. 
Circular flow assumptions that fail in the semicircular flow of the economy 
Several assumptions upon which the traditional circular flow of the economy model is built fail in the 
semicircular flow model. 
Money versus data 
In the circular flow of the economy, money serves as medium of exchange, unit of account, and store 
of value. As a means of payment, money is a clear yardstick with a clear value that allows the 
adjustment mechanism between supply and demand to generate explicit price signals. Money thus 
facilitates the functioning of the invisible hand: it is easy for everybody to understand and use it and its 
commonly accepted usage simplifies economic life (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010). Central banks 
control the supply of money and its price in terms of the interest rates. 
In pure and mixed data generation markets, each transaction generates information and data 
but not always a monetary flow. Data take on some of the roles of money. They can be considered to 
be a means of payment (Evans, 2013; Liem and Petropoulos, 2016; Tett, 2018; Scott Morton et al., 
2019) but the value of data is neither clear nor set by any authority, and data flows do not generate 
clearly comparable signals like prices. 
According to the Financial Times interactive calculator (Steel et al., 2013), data brokers pay 
between EUR 0.0005 and EUR 0.66 (calculations made in October 2018) for the data of individuals, 
depending on personal characteristics and the amount of detail. Some consider the data of individuals 
to be valueless, pointing out that it is only having hundreds of millions of pieces of data to mine and 
the process of mining it that adds value to the data (Worstall, 2017) by making it possible to predict 
and influence consumer behaviour. The advertising revenue of data holders illustrates that (Facebook, 
2014; Statista, 2015) the value of data is only realised after extracting knowledge from it. Atomistic 
data is not very valuable but massive data sets are. The positive externalities that data aggregation 
generates cannot be captured by individual agents, only by large data aggregators. This shifts the 
marginal productivity of information obtained from data away from individuals towards large 
computing machines with strong data feeds. Individuals can receive services generated after 
knowledge has been extracted from the data. Although people are more and more aware of this, many 
households and firms ignore the amount of data they produce in their daily lives and their (potential) 
value. 
Data cannot play the role of money as a unit of account. Several attempts are being made to 
measure the value of services in pure and mixed data generation markets (Coyle, 2018) and of the data 
held by data holders (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018; Tett, 2018). 
Data, as a key input to innovation (OECD, 2019), can be a potential store of value that 
generates competitive advantages in specific industries. Data can also give inside information about 
the whole economy and the economic cycle (Artola et al., 2015; Bollen et al., 2011; Choi and Varian, 
2011; Askitas and Zimmermann, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Gerow and Keane, 2012, Janetzko, 2014), 
open new opportunities for AI implementations, and generate market power. This makes data 
generation markets very attractive for investors and venture capitalists (Cadwalladr, 2017). 
There is no data authority equivalent to the central banks for the supply of money. An 
important legal difference between money and data is that whoever owns money can spend it on 
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anything. According to the GDPR (European Commission, 2016), data holders who have received 
informed consent from a data subject can only use the data for the specific and explicit purpose for 
which consent has been given. 
Circular versus semicircular data flows and no data leakages 
Data flows are semicircular: from households and firms to data holders. Household and firms receive 
data-driven services created from BD & AI but do not receive unprocessed data. In general, 
unprocessed data is not accessible to consumers, firms, governments, and the public sector. Unlike 
money, data does not generate a circular flow. Participants in platforms, for example, only receive the 
information that search algorithms show. The algorithms themselves are a black box. BD knowledge 
extraction is dominated by data holders that collect BD to feed AI and make more data collection 
possible. Even if there were a flow of data from data holders to households, they would not generally 
have the capacity to process them. The role of data and access to and reuse of it are of growing 
importance (OECD, 2019); data protection regulations and authorities are being set up (European 
Union, 2016 (9)) and mainly focus on data protection aspects but not on other dimensions of data. The 
right to data portability (European Union, 2016 (10)) has the potential to articulate a circular flow but 
stills needs further implementation and legal development beyond data protection (De Hert et al., 
2018). 
Product and factor markets versus the multifaceted role of data 
The traditional distinction between product and factor markets is blurred. Data is not only an input but 
also an output of pure and mixed data generation markets. For example, credit card data is an output 
of consumption processes that data holders collect to understand and predict consumer behaviour more 
accurately. They are also an input in BD knowledge extraction markets used to produce better digital 
services. Some consider data to be the ‘oil of the twenty-first century’ (Liem and Petropoulos, 2016) 
or a critical ingredient in virtually all innovation (OECD, 2019). In fact, as explained above this 
multifaceted role also applies in the traditional economy for electricity that is an output of the energy 
production process and an input in other production processes. 
Property rights enabling scale and scope 
The circular flow of the economy assumes clear property rights for factors of production. However, 
ownership of data is often unclear (Duch-Brown et al., 2017) and characterised by a de facto situation 
rather than clear property rights. De facto ownership supports the existence of the black box and 
market concentration. It constrains alternative uses of data: merit and non-rival uses of data that could 
increase knowledge and well-being without damaging privacy and the interests of data holders. This 
makes theoretical categorisation of data fundamental to identifying optimum degrees and forms of data 
sharing and access (OECD, 2015; Palfrey and Gasser, 2012; Scott Morton et al., 2019). In fact, GDPR 
(European Commission, 2016) intends to facilitate the free flow of personal data with the goal of 
protecting the rights of citizens. De Hert et al. (2018) point out the right to data portability is the novel 
feature of the GDPR that forms the basis for additional regulation beyond data protection and towards 
competition law or consumer protection. 
Specialisation versus sharing 
Although many aspects of the economy are still characterised by specialisation, the reduction in entry 
and search costs makes P2P sharing of idle assets among households possible, for example. 
Boundaries conventionally drawn between consumption and leisure and production have become more 
porous (Coyle, 2018; Coyle and Nakamura, 2019): private houses substitute for hotels and private cars 
substitute for taxis. According to Coyle and Nakamura (2018), digital technologies are bringing about 
substitution across both market and home production. The lack of specialisation and the switching of 
economic activity across production boundaries challenges regulations in many aspects: consumer 
protection, licences, taxation, labour conditions, informal supply of services, quality standards, 
                                           
(9) European Union (2016), Art. 51. 
(10) European Union (2016), Art. 20. 
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professional regulations, unfair competition with formal B2C service providers, and so on (Codagnone 
and Martens, 2016, Vaughan and Hawksworth, 2014; WEF, 2013; Malhotra and  Van Alstyne, 
2014) (11). 
National versus platform jurisdiction 
The traditional circular flow framework assumes that activities take place in a country and are taxed 
and regulated by the rule of law in that country. International activities are regulated by international 
law, agreements, and institutions in which countries are represented. Data flows in pure and mixed 
data generation markets operate globally, data holders operate online, and services are more 
intangible. This facilitates tax avoidance, breaches of the law, and avoiding regulation and state 
paternalism more easily. There is evidence in the literature of weaknesses in the international 
corporate tax system (D’Andria, forthcoming). It has been shown that large concentrations of large 
web-based company profits are found in low-tax jurisdictions whereas the value generated is 
distributed across countries. Some countries have started to tackle underpayment of taxes unilaterally 
(Pratley, 2018; Sandle, 2018) and other countries and international institutions have followed and are 
now devising how to tax digital activity (European Commission, 2018b). 
In traditional marketplaces, matching efficiency is driven by supply and demand search 
efforts, matching technology, information friction, and geography, but there is no specific centralised 
agent behind it. In market platforms, matching is driven by data holders who take a more active and 
prominent role that goes beyond supply and demand search efforts and matching. They act as 
intermediaries in an increasing number of markets by collecting data and obtaining information and 
knowledge about both sides of the market (Fradkin, 2015). They can influence the search and the 
matching efficiency, the number of participants who are brought together in the marketplace, and the 
distribution of information among participants. For example, in P2P sharing, platforms can decide 
about search rankings, the amount of information made available, exchange conditions, fees, matching 
algorithms, and regulations that rule the platform’s economic activity regardless of where the 
participants are located. If not too small, as may happen in market platforms with network effects, data 
holders may be able to influence the behaviour of market participants and violate the natural meaning 
of competition (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) at their convenience. This may raise concerns about 
dominance, monopsony-type market power, and abuse of economic dependence in a way that is not 
easily captured by competition legislation (Codagnone and Martens, 2016). The ability of data holders 
to collect fees strengthens their financial power (I↑) and is accompanied by a reduction in the 
government’s ability to collect taxes (T↓) and regulate markets12. 
In summary, economic activity is increasingly characterised by data generation in factor, 
product, pure, and mixed data generation markets. Table 1 summarizes the circular economy 
assumptions that fail in the data economy. Payments are not always made using money; data play a 
multifaceted role as a means of payment, as an input and as an output; neither data ownership nor their 
value are clear; goods and services are increasingly supplied by unspecialised sellers that depend on 
data holders; the public sector does not always regulate or establish the rules of marketplaces and 
online platforms; and digital markets are frequently not located in a specific country and subject to its 
regulations and property rights. Data flows in the digital economy are not circular and there is no data 
authority with a role that is equivalent to the role of a central bank in regulating flows of money in the 
traditional economy. Whether the semicircular flow model presents an economic problem and how 
regulators may react requires further analyses of its inherent market failures. In the following sections, 
we explore market failures in the knowledge extraction market black box and their consequences in 
factor, product, pure, and mixed data generation markets. 
 
                                           
(11) Problems also include measuring gross domestic product, productivity, and welfare, which needs reliable research to inform welfare 
policy (Coyle, 2018). This is also opening new opportunities that generate new positive externalities (Andrade et al., 2014; WEF, 
2014). 
12 And even by some data holders copying structures and institutions of states such as Courts (Macione 2019) 
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Table 1. Circular flow of the economy assumptions that fail in the data economy  
Circular flow model Semicircular flow model 
Monetary flows Data flows 
Circular flow Semicircular data flow 
Products and factors  Multifaceted role of data 
Property rights Unclear data property rights 
Specialisation Sharing 
National and international jurisdiction 
and taxation 
Data holders jurisdiction and fees  
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4. Market failures in big data knowledge extraction markets 
Data holders would not have an incentive to invest in pure and mixed data generation markets if they 
could not obtain at least de facto ownership of data and if there were no other market or production 
process where they could obtain a revenue stream from data. BD knowledge extraction markets were 
referred to in the previous section of this paper as a black box. This section examines the 
characteristics of the process of extracting knowledge information, the existence of economies of scale 
and scope, sunk costs, network effects, and the economic characterisation of data. Market failures are 
diverse and specific to each situation. The authors of this paper create explanations using general 
economic principles and illustrate them with specific examples from daily life, for which there is a 
need for more empirical evidence in most cases. If knowledge extraction has the characteristics of a 
natural monopoly, the knowledge generated would be less than socially desirable. Economic 
characterisation of data supports better regulation of de facto ownership of data, regulation that should 
maintain incentives for data holders to invest in data markets while at the same time ensuring 
additional knowledge generation. 
Economies of scope and scale in big data knowledge extraction markets 
The value of data is released after knowledge or valuable information has been extracted from it. AI 
offers a scaled-up automated application of existing statistical techniques that enables recognition of 
patterns, regularities, and structures in data without an a priori theoretical framework (Boisot and 
Canals, 2004; Duch-Brown et al., 2017; Vigo, 2013). Machine learning models can be tested and 
continuously improved with new data. Economies of scope and scale arise because data holders have 
an incentive to centralise their processes of extracting knowledge/information from data and applying 
it to services such as marketing. Efficiencies are formed by volume (scale) and variety (scope) and 
involve lowering the average cost of producing knowledge/information from bigger and more detailed 
data sets in order to improve the prediction of consumer needs and to market more types of products in 
real time. Scale and scope are a direct consequence of ‘two Vs’ in the definition of BD (Laney, 2001, 
2012): volume and variety. Scale and scope explain the emergence and growth of (digital) giant data 
holders such as Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, or eBay and their investment in companies 
operating in pure and mixed data generation markets, AI research companies, offline products such as 
mobile devices and gadgets such as smart watches, and services. 
Regarding knowledge/information extraction, algorithms trained on one data set may be 
transposed to other complementary data sets and adjacent data (Duch-Brown et al., 2017) to obtain 
more and better predictions. The greater the amount of information available about consumers, the 
better their preferences, and needs can be identified. In statistical terms, scale refers to the number of 
observations (N) and scope to the number of explanatory variables (X). Volume facilitates the 
determination of the specification of models because the larger the number of consumers observed (N), 
the greater the degrees of freedom to include more variables (X). The higher the number of significant 
variables (scope/variety) and observations (scale/ volume), the more robust and complete are estimates 
of consumer patterns and behaviour. Scale facilitates scope and scope is an incentive to increase scale. 
Think of an algorithm to predict where a consumer is planning to spend his or her next holiday in 
order to offer tailored goods and services. A consumer planning a trip is very likely to search online 
for the name of the place (Artola et al., 2015). Using online searches as a predictor of holiday 
destinations, the algorithm can improve by including more variables, such as other searches about 
hotels, flights, Facebook activity sharing plans with friends, or payment data. The algorithm can also 
improve by including context variables such as the weather forecast. A posteriori testing is also 
possible by, for example, using the geographical location of that person in a search engine. In 
summary, as long as agents are connected and generating data and the use of technology expands, 
more and more variables can be taken into account to predict behaviour, making the observation of 
more individuals desirable. Consequently, economies of scale and scope apply to an increasing 
amount of human activities and sectors of the economy. This is reinforced by the ‘self-teaching’ nature 
of algorithms when they are fed with more data. This also leads to existing services being improved, 
new ones developed, and additional data collected on new aspects of life. Looking at categories in the 
Apple App Store and Google Play illustrates data holder interests in increasing X. They mainly focus 
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on games but expand to lifestyle, education, health, finance, news, and social networking (13). Data 
collection from non-users illustrates interest in increasing N (Financial Times 2019). The acquisition 
of the Weather Company by IBM in 2015 shows the importance of contextual data.   
Similar dynamics apply to knowledge applications to services such as marketing or match-
making. Cross-selling one product alongside another, using the outputs of one business as the inputs of 
another, is an example of economies of scope. Better predictions can improve marketing, reduce 
search costs, generate synergies, and improve consumer experiences. Economies of scope make 
product diversification an efficient growth strategy (Ansoff, 1957) if based on common know-how. As 
similar tools and channels are able to market multiple products more cheaply and efficiently in 
combination than separately, data holders can reap economies of scope. Offering a range of products 
tailored to  specific consumer characteristics, their situation, personality, needs, contexts, and 
consumption habits in real time and at the right moment gives consumers a more desirable experience 
at lower search costs than separate consumption of individual products. Following up on the holiday 
example, companies can offer car rental or hotel accommodation to consumers who have just booked a 
flight. Building on this holiday model, data from Spotify, Songkick, Tinder, etc., can match the 
traveller with events that will interest him or her or with travellers with similar interests. 
Figure 6 summarises the scale and scope reinforcing loop that characterises BD knowledge 
information extraction and its applications to marketing. Data holders are in a race towards 
X = Everything accompanied by N = All (Hey et al., 2009; Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013) 
enabling self-teaching algorithms, existing services to be improved, and generating new ones that 
expand the use of BD and AI to new realms of life and increase the number of people from whom data 
is captured, which reinforces the loop by increasing N, people observed, and X, aspects of their lives. 
Figure 6. Big data knowledge extraction scale and scope loop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economies of scale operate up to a point at which they may give way to diminishing returns of 
scale. Thinking in standard statistical terms, this means that the additional knowledge gained by 
including more observations (N) begins to decrease. In a simple ordinary least squares estimation of a 
dependent variable as a function of several explanatory ones, diminishing returns may begin after a 
few thousand observations (Varian, 2013). After a certain N randomly extracted from the same 
population, estimated elasticities change very little. That is not necessarily the case in knowledge and 
information extraction from BD in which economies of scale and scope operate together and reinforce 
each other. As more and more aspects of the lives of consumers can be observed, more predictors can 
be tested and more services can be ‘data driven’, making more volume desirable. It is difficult to 
imagine when diminishing returns may begin in a situation in which almost any variable can be tested 
as a predictor of the real-time needs of any consumer. In fact, AI algorithms should become more 
                                           
(13) See the most popular Apple App Store categories in September 2018 (https://www.statista.com/statistics/270291/popular-categories-
in-the-app-store/). See the most popular Google Play categories in September 2018(https://www.appbrain.com/stats/android-market-
app-categories). 
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accurate as more data becomes accessible to them. For example, the more people use Facebook and 
the more information about them is available in their profiles, the more accurately targeted 
advertisements should become. The more people use search engines, the better they work. And the 
more people tag pictures of friends, the higher the accuracy of recognising the faces of people in 
pictures. 
Identifying where economies of scale stop and give way to diminishing returns is an empirical 
question on which little evidence is available to our knowledge. There is some work showing that the 
marginal cost of storing an additional megabyte of data is very low (Rubens, 2014). Moreover, AI 
systems are now being developed that are capable of even generating their own training sets of data 
without any ‘pollution’ from established human theory. For example, this was how the entirely self-
taught (by playing itself an enormous number of times) AlphaGoZero AI algorithm became the best 
‘player’ of Go in history, far exceeding human capabilities. The hypothesis ‘the more data the better’ 
(Silver et al., 2017) without hitting diminishing returns is anecdotally supported by the emergence of a 
small number of ‘massive’ data holders in the form of the dominant platform companies (Facebook, 
Google, Amazon) expanding to new sectors and activities. OECD (2019) and Unctad (2017) report 
evidence of increasing concentration in the digital sector and lower tax rates. AI- and BD-driven 
acquisitions and partnerships between companies (Economist, 2017) also illustrate the presence of 
incentives to centralise BD knowledge extraction and the scale and scope loop. 
The costs of diversification and innovation may operate in opposition to scale and scope. They 
oppose concentration in service, product, and data production markets but not BD knowledge 
extraction. 
Regarding cost of diversification, it usually requires a company to acquire new skills, 
knowledge, resources, and understanding of market behaviour and product development. Extracting 
knowledge from data to obtain insights into behaviour and marketing, reducing search costs, match-
making, advertising, and creating digital services is a specialisation in itself. Data holders are 
specialised in extracting knowledge and information from BD. They are very often not directly 
involved in producing physical goods as other agents provide the final goods. There is no initial need 
to develop new physical products, but they need to innovate continuously to keep data factories (pure 
and mixed data generation markets) functioning. Platform economy has its limits (Azzellini et al. 
2019) but data holder expand into physical production and sectors where platforms are not yet taking 
over. Such an expansion is mainly data driven and it does not imply a new specialisation. This is the 
case in Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods (Hirsch, 2018) or Sofa Sounds partnership with Uber 
and AirBnB (Azzellini et al. 2019). However, knowledge extraction is not specifically included in the 
NACE classification (
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) system. 
Regarding innovation, it has been traditionally considered as opposing scale and scope. 
However, the scale and scope loop implies that giant data holders take over new innovations. 
Successful innovations in pure and mixed data production markets are very often taken over especially 
when they display networking effects. Instagram and WhatsApp’s acquisitions by Facebook in 2012 
and 2014 respectively and Google’s acquisition of YouTube in 2006 are good examples. Facebook’s 
DeepText, an AI natural language processor able to learn the intentions and context of users in 20 
languages and investments made by Facebook in face recognition(
15
) technologies show how 
concentration is accompanied by AI. In general, access to data is a critical ingredient in innovation 
(OECD, 2019). 
Studies in the literature have identified other forces that may oppose and limit concentration 
such as capacity constraints, product differentiation, specialisation, and vertical or horizontal 
differentiation, congestion, heterogeneity, and multi-homing. There can be capacity constraints 
regarding advertising space or the variety of products that can be displayed. Technology is 
increasingly able to overcome some of these problems by improving searching, targeting, and 
                                           
(14)  The Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community, commonly referred to as NACE (for the French 
term "nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne"), is the industry standard classification 
system used in the European Union. It is the European implementation of the UN classification ISIC. 
(15)  Mark Zuckerberg’s long-term plan for Facebook is centred on three main pillars: artificial intelligence, increased connectivity around 
the world, and virtual and augmented reality. In November 2016, Facebook acquired FacioMetrics, a face recognition technology 
company started out of Carnegie Mellon. Face recognition is the new way to identify individual persons, the substitute of fingerprints 
that will allow real time recognition. It will help in catching criminals but is raising a lot of privacy concerns (Bedoya 2017). 
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matching algorithms that are able to reduce the problems of capacity constraints. Multi-homing 
implies that one or both sides of the market use more than one platform. It is limited if there are 
network and lock-in effects (Evans, 2003). These forces oppose concentration in pure and mixed data 
generation markets but not the scale and scope loop of BD knowledge extraction. They do not oppose 
incentives to centralise knowledge extraction and the resulting AI- and BD-driven partnerships and 
acquisitions. Interconnections and partnerships between agents that operate in different data generation 
markets illustrate this (16). 
Sunk costs 
Fixed costs in the data economy tend to be especially high. On the one hand, there is connectivity 
infrastructure for  such things as broadband Internet connections that make the Internet accessible to 
households, firms, and data holders (Unctad, 2017), which are very often developed by the public 
sector. On the other hand, there is investment in research and development, data centres, cloud 
computing arms, and data refineries to handle data generation and collection to develop AI and 
improve knowledge extraction. As AI development is fed with the data, access to data is a key to 
innovation (UTI, 2018) and a barrier to entry (OECD, 2019). This surely explains at least part of the 
reason why data holders so often invest in (apparently) non-profitable companies that have developed 
data generation capacity in pure and mixed data production markets (Bond and Bullock 2019; 
Kaminska, 2016; McArdle, 2019). 
Network effects and barriers to entry 
Network effects occur when the number of users increases the value of the service for others using the 
service. The more people there are with a Facebook profile, the more people can be contacted by 
Facebook and the better the service provided by Facebook will be. Indirect network effects occur 
when users on one side of the market attract users from the other side. In a marketplace more buyers 
attract more sellers, increasing the variety of goods and attracting more buyers. Online platforms are 
characterised by the existence of direct and indirect network effects and a high fixed costs and low 
variable costs structure (Duch-Brown, 2017a). This may lead to higher concentration rather than the 
use of traditional marginal cost pricing. 
There might be negative externalities from additional users if this implies an increase in group 
heterogeneity and in search costs. As a result, vertically and horizontally specialised platforms may 
emerge with specific target audiences (in, for example, academia, dating, job searching, etc.). These 
negative externalities may oppose concentration in pure and mixed data generation markets in which 
different platforms may continue operating separately even if they are technically within the same 
parent company such as Facebook and WhatsApp. For example, during the process of obtaining 
European Commission approval to merge Facebook and WhatsApp (European Commission, 2017), 
Facebook pledged that it would not merge user -bases but has since said that it intends to do so, 
showing that network negative externalities do not oppose the scale and scope of knowledge 
extraction. 
In general, forces that oppose concentration make markets such as the ‘app economy’ (Basole 
and Karla, 2012) very specialised and fragmented and generate competition between apps, but, again, 
this does not necessarily counteract the digital scale and scope loop described in Figure 6 (17). 
                                           
(16) For example, MasterCard Advisors are IBM Watson partners. PayPal is, in principle, a Mastercard competitor, but Mastercard owns a 
percentage of PayPal and PayPal is a Facebook partner. Facebook has received investment from PayPal. In China, social networks and 
the payment industry are already integrated into the same company through the Chinese ‘WeChat’, which, in a single application, 
offers services such as Instagram, Facebook, and WhatsApp together with payment services. Google’s acquisition of DeepMind, the 
world AI leader, in 2014 also illustrates the reinforcing nature of BD and AI. DeepMind also has access to public records through its 
agreement with the United Kingdom’s National Health Service. IBM’s acquisition of the Weather Company in 2015 illustrates that 
concentration goes beyond personal data to information on variables that determine consumer behaviour.  
(17) For example, the ‘mobile application ecosystem’ comprises an ecosystem orchestrator, mobile application developers, and mobile 
device owners that are connected through a market platform (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2014). Data holders have created their own application 
ecosystems, such as Google Play, the Apple App Store and the Microsoft Windows Phone Store, in which they control the transaction 
infrastructures. Mobile application offers are used as a tool to distinguish one company from its competitors in the mobile devices 
market (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2012). Therefore, apps markets may operate like competitive markets but within the framework of a data 
processor-controlled ecosystem. When apps do not display network effects they can be replicated. But whenever an app successfully 
displays a network effect it tends to become a takeover target for one of the giant data holders. The aforementioned acquisition of 
WhatsApp by Facebook and YouTube by Google/Alphabet are two examples (Codagnone and Martens, 2016; Rysman, 2009).  
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If economies of scale and scope, sunk costs, small marginal costs and other barriers to entry 
operate together, the market may have natural monopoly features. This raises concerns over market 
concentration (Mckinsey, 2018, 2019) and the need for research on market structure and anti-trust 
policies (Scott Morton et al., 2019). A small number of data holders have become digital giants that 
dominate the ability to collect huge amounts of data and extract knowledge information. By 2017 five 
out of the ten biggest companies in the world were BD- and AI-related companies (Gray, 2017). Their 
revenue is higher than the gross domestic product of many countries (Investopedia, 2015). Their 
power extends beyond their revenues because a small number of companies directly or indirectly 
control the world economy (Vitaly et al., 2011). Studies in the literature have identified that ‘superstar 
effects’ (Mckinsey, 2018, 2019; Scott Morton et al., 2019) may be related to access to data (ITU, 
2018). Market concentration is not a clearly established empirical fact. It is not clear whether the 
overall degree of competition has decreased because of digitalisation. On the one hand, large 
companies and access to deeper data lakes spur investment and innovation in AI methods and avoid 
duplication of resources. On the other hand, the concentration of research and development inside a 
small number of very large companies may reduce innovation by creating barriers to entry for smaller, 
new, and innovative firms. If monopoly theory applies, the amount of knowledge generated maximises 
the profit made by data holders and would be below a socially desirable amount. Underutilisation of 
data as a resource would motivate intervention to boost knowledge production: de facto ownership of 
data protects  investment by data holders and innovation by them but limits additional knowledge 
generation. It is generally assumed that well-defined property rights are a precondition for efficient 
allocation of resources. In the following sub-section the economic characterisation of data is explored 
and whether they are a private good whereby the market can lead to an efficient allocation of resources 
as well as whether data is a merit or a demerit good is also explored. 
Data economic characterisation and ownership 
Economists classify goods as public, private, club, or common pool goods (18) to identify goods that 
share similar dysfunctions and so may benefit from similar solutions. In general, with private 
goods (19) the market leads to efficient allocation of resources, while for public goods (20) government 
intervention is needed to avoid issues such as free rider (21) problems, underproduction, degradation 
through overuse, and potential destruction (22) (23). Traditional solutions to these problems are taxation, 
                                           
(18) Classification emerges from whether a good is excludable or not and whether it is a rival or not. A good is excludable when 
individuals can be excluded from using it and non-excludable when individuals cannot be excluded. A good is a rival when the amount 
consumed by an individual reduces the amount available for others and non-rival when the amount consumed by an individual does 
not reduce the amount available for others. The possible combinations are traditionally presented in a matrix as in Table 2 (Samuelson, 
1954). 
(19) A private good is excludable and rival. Examples are food and clothes. The owner of a jacket can exclude other people from using it 
and two people cannot wear the same jacket at the same time. Producers of private goods can also exclude consumers not willing to 
pay the price, which makes it possible for them to make a profit. Economic thinking considers that well-defined property rights is a 
precondition for efficient resource allocation: market forces of supply and demand determine the price and the quantity based on 
consumer willingness to pay and cost of production to producers. Government intervention as a supplement to the existing legal 
frameworks defining property rights, how to buy, sell, and enforce contracts, and so on is not necessary. 
(20) Public goods are non-excludable and non-rival, an example of market failure because property rights are not well defined and people 
do not weigh up all the costs of their actions. Air, the environment, national defence, and street lights are examples. Nobody can be 
excluded from breathing and the amount a person breathes does not reduce the amount available to others, which generates 
overutilisation, and pollution. 
(21) The free rider problem implies that public goods can be consumed without contribution or payment. Private production cannot reap 
benefits from their production. Therefore, there are no incentives to provide them through the market. It may lead to underproduction 
unless they are produced by the public sector. This is the case for national defence from which none can be excluded. Public 
interventions of this type are represented in circular flows through taxation (leakage) and government expending (injection) on, in this 
case, national defence. 
(22) Excessive use may result in negative externalities such as air pollution or potential destruction of resources. This is known as the 
tragedy of commons because common pool resources also suffer from this failure. For example, as it is difficult to exclude fishermen 
from fish stocks, the amount of fish caught by a ship reduces the amount available to others. Fishing grounds allow for a certain 
amount of fishing after which they may be damaged. In practice, preservation of resources can be enforced by government regulation 
of access or assigning property rights. Property rights may imply different things such as the right to access, exclude, and sell that 
reallocate the use of the resources to avoid overutilisation and future destruction. In the case of the environment the extension of 
property rights has been proven to reduce pollution 
(23) Both the free rider problem and overutilisation can be solved by restricting access and transforming a public good into a club or 
private goods. For example, technology can encrypt television or radio broadcasting giving access only to members. Club goods are 
excludable and non-rival. In the satellite television example, non-members can be excluded. The amount of television consumed by 
one member does not reduce the amount available to other members. Copyrights and patents are legal mechanisms to enforce 
exclusion for a period of time.  
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copyrights, patents, regulation of access, and/or assigning property rights. Measures to eliminate 
market failures are not always satisfactory as they may generate new failures. In this section we 
explore what kind of good data is in order to shed light on theoretical data ownership consequences.  
According to Duch-Brown et al. (2017), under extremely restrictive assumptions, data can be 
considered a public good: non-excludable and non-rival. 
If a public good is one ‘all enjoy in common and each individual’s consumption of such a 
good leads to no subtractions from any other individual’s consumption of that good’ (Samuelson, 
1954, 1955), data is not a public good. Firstly, not ‘all’ agents enjoy access to data collected by data 
holders (24). It can be argued that ‘all’ may enjoy data but only when processed in the form of 
customised goods or services (Bergemann and Bonatti 2018, Bergemann et al., 2018). Services 
produced from data, such as search engines and social networks, may fit the above definition. Nobody 
is, in principle, prevented from using a search engine and how many searches a person consumes does 
not reduce the amount available to others. However, search engine users are not directly using the data 
but the services that the search engine owner extracts from them to maximise its profit. Therefore, 
only certain fractions of knowledge extracted from data can be considered to be a public good but not 
BD as a whole. 
Duch-Brown et al.’s (2017) characterisation builds on the arrow information paradox 
assumption: once data is shown to a potential data client/customer, they can no longer be sold because 
the customer already has the information. However, first, data is not always restricted to the arrow 
paradox. Data does not need to be shown in its entirety to a data client. Its content can be perfectly 
understood by means of metadata, small samples, or examples. In practice data is typically 
excludable. Agents are effectively excluded from data collected by data holders. 
Table 2. Public, private, club, and common pool goods 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival Private goods/resources 
Food, clothes, cars 
Digital data in BD knowledge 
extraction market 
Common pool resources 
Fish stocks, timber, coal 
Non-rival Club goods/resources 
Traditional examples: cinema, 
private parks, satellite television 
Digital data in the data market, BD 
knowledge extraction 
Public goods/resources 
Air, national defence, knowledge, 
official statistics, lighthouses, street 
lights 
Fractions of knowledge and services 
extracted from data  
 
Regarding, non-rivalry, in the strict sense, the amount of data used by a company does not 
reduce the amount available to other companies. Data can be used by any number of agents without 
being depleted, which opens a great many possibilities for generating social gains by data sharing 
(Jones and Tonetti, 2018). However, giving the competitors of data holders access to data would 
reduce the profit that can be obtained from data and reduce the incentive to invest and innovate in data 
production markets and in knowledge extraction. This could reduce the amount of data generated in 
the economy and the innovation and knowledge it could generate. That could be considered an 
overutilisation that would lead to a tragedy of commons damaging the data generation process. 
Current de facto unregulated ownership includes alienation rights and the right to sell, process, and 
                                           
(24) Some agents enjoy public access to some data collected by data holders. For example, flight and train schedules are publicly available 
for everyone to see. Google makes Google Trends available but that is a very small proportion of its data (Artola et al., 2015). Among 
the academic community, data access is mainly dependent on contacts and the seniority of researchers and data is very often offered 
subject to non-disclosure agreements. The real situation for social sciences is that at a time when data dissemination and scholar 
communication could increase tremendously, the replicability of research is really in danger. Academic journals are yet to implement 
a policy of not publishing research carried out using data invisible to everyone but the authors. Companies may ‘not like the prospect 
of negotiating access with individuals in case by case basis, and decide not to make data available to everybody or to nobody’ (Taylor 
et al., 2014, page 8). 
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obtain profit and avoids free-riding from competitors. It preserves incentives for data holders but 
reinforces market concentration, keeps the ‘black box’ closed, generates information asymmetries, and 
limits additional generation of knowledge. Rivalry or non-rivalry has traditionally depended on the 
nature of the good rather than in the market setting. In the case of data, it seems to depend on the type 
of use and whether it ‘rivals’ the interests of data holders and the data generation processes. 
If data is excludable and non-rival, it may be best be considered to be a ‘club’ good within the 
data lake of a given data processor. De facto ownership avoids problems such as free-riding but 
generates and reinforces market failures such as market concentration and data underutilisation. 
There are goods that although not exactly within the concept of public goods, can be 
underconsumed if provided by the free market (merit goods such as education) or overconsumed 
(demerit goods such as illicit drugs) (Musgrave, 1959). The idea behind merit and demerit goods is 
that a well-informed society is in a better position to identify the amount of certain goods needed than 
individual agents and their willingness or ability to pay for and/or process information (25). 
Governments impose community standards and support consumption of merit goods such as 
education, and ban demerit goods such as illicit drugs. The public sector aims to solve information 
failures and improve consumer sovereignty and is based on knowledge of the individual and 
community consequences of merit and demerit goods. Depending on how it is used, data can be a 
merit or a demerit good. Data is a merit good when used to reduce market frictions, information costs, 
and information asymmetries, to generate knowledge and better matches between supply and demand, 
to facilitate full performance of private assets that otherwise would be idle, to innovate, to deliver 
nimbler policies to prevent and mitigate the consequences for the economic cycle, and so on. Data is a 
demerit good when used to generate market power, set barriers to entry, generate information 
asymmetries, and when used by a monopoly to control marketplaces, to charge unfair fees or prices, or 
to impose excessive regulations limiting innovation or generating unacceptable distribution of wealth. 
A society where BD knowledge extraction occurs within a black box is not a well-informed 
society regarding the basis up which many important economic decisions are made. There are potential 
non-rival and merit uses of data that may increase well-being without damaging data holders and their 
data factories. The next section focuses on information asymmetries to further identify merit and 
demerit uses of data and illustrate whether the current flow of knowledge generated by data holders is 
a socially desirable amount. 
                                           
(25) For example, without education and maturity individuals cannot make well-informed choices about the amount of education they 
should consume. Before education, individuals ignore the positive consequences of higher educational levels on income and 
happiness. Society as a whole benefits from individual education because it displays positive externalities for well-being, citizen 
security, and economic growth. Similarly, drug addicts cannot decide for themselves and drug markets and consumption generate 
negative burdens on the whole of society through expenditure on health and social security. 
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5. Information asymmetries in factor, product, pure, and mixed data generation 
markets 
Distribution of information has always affected market outcomes (Duch-Brown, 2017a; Stiglitz, 
2001), but data ownership, access, and trade in the digital economy may be even more important for 
economic welfare (Duch-Brown, 2017 a, 2017 b , and 2017 c). Although digitalisation reduces 
information costs, it does not solve information asymmetries. Data holders do not disclose data or 
important metrics (Codagnone and Martens, 2016; Hall and Krueger, 2015). Information asymmetries 
occur between data holders and households (consumers), offering opportunities for price 
discrimination: between data holders and firms (traditional suppliers) giving rise to concerns about 
unfair competition, and between data holders and merit users of data, such as regulatory authorities 
and the social sciences community. In addition, information asymmetries are giving rise to concerns 
related to inequality in the wider economy and society. 
Asymmetric information between data holders and households (consumers) 
This asymmetry can generate at least two types of market failures: (price) discrimination and steered 
consumption. According to a 2015 report from the White House Council of Economic Advisers, 
‘sellers are now using big data and digital technology to explore consumer demand, to steer consumers 
towards particular products, to create targeted advertising and marketing offers, and in a more limited 
and experimental fashion, to set personalized prices’ (White House, 2015, Ursu, 2015). Information 
asymmetries between supply and demand have traditionally occurred in the uncertainty of product 
quality (Akerlof, 1970). New information asymmetries are arising as a result of the ability of data 
holders to collect and process consumer data. It creates an imbalance of power in transactions because 
one side of the market is able to price discriminate by obtaining person-specific reservation prices. 
There are several pieces of empirical evidence that claim openness and transparency in this respect. 
Mikians et al. (2012) demonstrated the existence of both price and search discrimination on the 
Internet. Shiller (2014) found evidence in the Netflix context (26). Chen et al. (2015) studied Uber (27) 
price surges, and Möhlmann and Zalmanson (2017) investigated how Uber’s drivers may generate 
price increases, while Uber (2018) claims to be able to self-regulate such situations. Ezrachi and Stuke 
(2016) showed that sellers are able to find the right emotional moment to steer consumers into buying. 
Price discrimination may also be beneficial for more price-sensitive consumers to whom 
companies can offer the cheapest option. Choey et al. (2016) showed that firms are not necessarily 
better off when price discriminating than when competing under uniform pricing. Discriminatory 
pricing may generate competitive reactions opposing it. Consumers have access to more information, 
search engines, and price robots to find the best offers (Kramer and Kalka, 2016). However, it is 
difficult for consumers to understand how these search robots work, their reliability, or the algorithms 
and reasons behind low monetary prices. In some sectors, undercutting monetary prices is the strategy 
used by new business models to eliminate competition in the supply of traditional products while 
receiving part of the payment in data. 
Tools for discrimination can go beyond prices and lead to discrimination and unfair treatment. 
Uber, for example, has developed an internal tool called Greyball which uses data collected from the 
Uber app, geolocation data, credit card information, social media accounts, and other data points to 
avoid giving rides to certain individuals such as law enforcement officers and government officials in 
areas where its service is or was illegal (Isaac, 2017; Wong, 2017). Discrimination may be even more 
problematic in the case of insurance services, which can become prohibitively expensive for people 
with specific diseases such as genetic disorders. 
The potential to discriminate, steer consumers, and identify their sentiments (Pilaszy and Tikk, 
2009) at specific moments is an additional incentive for developing scale and scope and for data-
                                           
(26) According to Shiller et al. (2012), using demographics to tailor prices raises profits by 0.8 %. Including nearly 5 000 website browsing 
explanatory variables increases profits by 12.2 % as a result of some consumers paying double the price others do for exactly the same 
product. 
(27) Uber Technologies Inc. is a transport network company operating in many cities worldwide through the Uber car transport and food 
delivery mobile apps. Uber has been a pioneer in the sharing economy. ‘Uberification’ or ‘Uberisation’ refers to changes in industries 
that challenge traditional specialisation as a result of the sharing economy. Uber has been the subject of protests and legal action on 
several issues because of its, perhaps unfair, competition with some traditional public transport services. 
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driven partnerships. For example, think about the possibilities of merging data from Facebook (28), 
which has already raised concerns about privacy and micro-targeting of adverts in political campaigns, 
and payment industry information (29), which includes detailed information about spending habits. 
More knowledge in this respect is socially desirable. 
Asymmetric information and unfair competition between data holders and firms 
(traditional suppliers) 
This asymmetry can generate at least two types of market failures: predatory pricing and monopsony 
behaviours. 
Unfair competition emerges as a result of data access and competition via price undercutting 
leading to predatory (monetary) pricing, while part of the payment is implicitly made using the 
consumers’ data. Predatory pricing implies selling at prices below the cost of production to drive 
competitors out of the market or to create barriers to entry for potential new competitors so that the 
predator company becomes a monopoly. Economic theory distinguishes two stages of predation. First, 
there is the stage when the predator offers goods and services below their cost of production. The 
predator needs to be financially strong because during this stage the company may incur losses. The 
second is the recouping stage, which begins once the predator has market power, and the ability to 
raise prices above competitive, or even monopoly, levels. During this stage it recovers from losses 
incurred during the predation stage. Predatory pricing may fail if the predator’s competitors are strong 
enough to survive or are replaced by others. The strategy succeeds when the predator is stronger than 
its competitors and when there are barriers that prevent new entrants joining the market. Empirically, it 
may be difficult to identify when prices are low because of deliberate predatory pricing rather than as a 
result of legitimate competition from a more efficient and innovative producer (Bensinger, 2012; Bond 
and Bullock, 2019; Kaminska, 2016; McArdle, 2019,). In some cases, such as multi-sided platforms, 
pricing below marginal cost on one side may not be predatory but profit maximisation (Codagnone 
and Martens, 2016). Predator identification is even more difficult in pure and mixed data production 
markets when data is part of the payment. Data gives digital predators a stronger position and more 
chances of succeeding. The predator can move simultaneously to the recouping stage as value of the 
data can be released in the BD knowledge extraction markets (30). More knowledge aiming to improve 
understanding of pricing strategies in the black box is socially desirable. 
 
                                           
(28) Facebook makes it possible for marketers to effectively target very specific audiences depending on the marketing objectives of 
advertisements. Facebook’s ‘topic data’ gives marketing personnel information about topics which people are engaged in and enable 
marketing based on what audiences are saying on Facebook about events, brands, subjects, activities, their sentiments, the volume, the 
location, etc. This helps create content and identify the perfect time and location to reach potential consumers. Although querying 
‘topic data’ results cannot instantly turn into advertisement targeting, advertisements can be set to target people in similar 
demographics and with similar variables. To develop ‘topic data’ Facebook worked with DataSift and its partner NetBase, a social 
analytics platform, which connects global companies with consumers. NetBase’s platform processes media posts for business insights, 
marketing, customer services, sales, and product innovation. Companies such as American Airlines, Arby’s, Coca-Cola, Ogilvy, T-
Mobile, Universal Music Group, Walmart, and YUM! Brands are NetBase partners. Advertising on Facebook and topic data have also 
been used for political marketing. Both tools were used during the Brexit referendum and the 2017 United States electoral campaigns 
(Cadwalladr, 2017).  
(29) For example, Mastercard holds billions of transactional and payment data on the underlying processes (geographical location, time, 
online/offline, amount, etc.), the demographic characteristics and the spending habits of cardholders. MasterCard Advisors translates 
data into behavioural insights and customises services to financial institutions, merchants, media companies, and governments to help 
them market their products. It provides critical information to direct the right messages and offers to the cardholders most likely to 
respond.  
(30) De facto ownership of data not only builds up a barrier to entry for new competitors but also for services traditionally provided by the 
public sector. For example, Kutsuplus was a public version of Uber, developed by Helsinki County Council. Despite year on year 
growth of 60 %, it shut down because it was too expensive for the local authority to run. The Kutsuplus example raises doubts about 
Uber’s price undercutting policies. Uber is a not profitable company but it is a good example of financial strength. It has the strategic 
support of data holders and data-hungry venture capitalists such as Google, Amazon, and Goldman Sachs. In the case of public 
transport in Helsinki, public provision of an Uber-like platform was not viable because of strategic price undercutting. financed by 
Uber’s data holders. This example also illustrates how the economy evolves towards disequilibrium, as in equation 4 in Section 6. 
First, the public sector shrinks, given the difficulties in taxing digital activity. Second, the digital supplier has enough financial 
strength to operate with predatory pricing while collecting more data that will increase its competitive advantage and capacity to 
innovate. In the new equilibrium, public expenditure on public transport is substituted by private investment. This example also 
illustrates economies of scale and scope. Scale and scope are not limited to an industry or sector but to many realms in the economy 
and perhaps even the whole economy: N = All and X = Everything. It shows how search engines and online platforms can expand to 
the transport industry. The expansion goes beyond that, as Uber is evolving from a platform providing a transport network for people 
to one involved in adjacent industries such as parcel and food delivery, and even towards self-driving cars. 
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Asymmetric information and unfair competition between data holders and firms may also 
evolve by means of monopsony behaviours. As the Internet penetrates more activities in society, 
supply increasingly depends on digital channels to market and sell products. Market structures have 
emerged in which either a buyer substantially controls the market as the major purchaser or a platform 
dominates a market. This is the case for Netflix in the film industry or Amazon’s dominant position in 
online book sales (Krugman, 2014). As stated above, the Amazon example illustrates that scale and 
scope do not refer to a single industry but to N = All and X = Everything. It recently acquired Whole 
Foods, expanding into fresh food delivery and acquiring a lot of data on the Whole Food shopping 
experience and obtaining insights into offline/online habits (Hirsch, 2018). In 2016, 30 % of Amazon’s 
profit was generated by its activity as an online retailer. In 2018, that proportion grew to 50 %, which 
shows its expansion as a marketplace. More knowledge aiming at a better understanding of the market 
structure of knowledge extraction is socially desirable. 
Asymmetric information between data holders and merit users 
Information failures and asymmetries in many markets have been substantially reduced. For example, 
families have more information about other families and the assets they are willing to share, making 
new exchanges and transactions possible. In general, data holders reduce information and search costs 
which in principle lead to an improvement in supply- and demand-matching technology (Coles and 
Smith, 1996) and benefits for all: consumers get more convenient and cheaper choices and producers 
obtain revenue (Martens, 2016). However, it is not known whether platforms are designed to minimise 
search costs and maximise user interests rather than to maximise their profit and take advantage of 
market failures. The flow of knowledge and information in the semicircular flow of the economy 
mainly relies on the good intentions (Einav and Levin 2013) of the data holders rather than on legal 
security, law enforcement, and policy action guided by scientific evidence. Agents such as regulatory 
authorities and the scientific community could in theory make non-rival and merit use of BD and AI 
by looking into ‘the black box’ to guide policy. However, their access to algorithms and data is very 
limited (Scott Morton et al., 2019; Taylor et al., 2014; Butler 2013; Artola et al 2015; Lazer et 
al.2014). From a regulatory point of view, the current situation is characterised by many legal voids 
and the absence of applicable regulations. It sustains itself in an economic sense because data holders 
have generated their own systems to substitute state regulations, law enforcement, and taxation. 
Platforms can set transaction rules and conditions and charge fees for their matching services. The 
‘sharing economy’, for example, has developed its own liability systems by means of consumer 
reviews or ratings. Trust among participants acts as a substitute for consumer protection regulations. 
These liability systems may reinforce unfair competition because reputation is platform specific, and it 
is difficult to transfer to a different platform and generate lock-in effects. More knowledge is socially 
desirable to guarantee data holders act with good intentions. 
The scientific community has shown the ability of BD to predict a diverse range of real-life 
variables related to the economic cycle and the stock exchange (Askitas and Zimmermann, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c; Bollen et al., 2011; Choi and Varian, 2011; Gerow and Keane, 2012; Edelman 2012, 
Pedraza et al., 2019; Reips and Garaizar, 2011) even when the amount of data available to researchers 
is only a small proportion of data holders’ data lakes (Artola et al., 2015, Butler, 2013; Lazer et 
al.2014). From a scientific point of view, BD are also underutilised because society and 
policymaking are not fully benefiting from the extraction of scientific knowledge that could inform 
government responses to the economic cycle macroeconomic stability. Such use would be non-rival, 
Pareto efficient, and merit, and could change the scale and scope of knowledge about many 
phenomena (Schroeder and Cowls, 2014). 
Asymmetric information, income distribution, and separation of powers 
Distribution of information generates asymmetries, which foster inequalities (Duch-Brown, 2017; 
Stiglitz, 2001). The unequal distribution of BD knowledge extraction exacerbates inequality. The 
United Nations (UN, 2013) has called for a global partnership to eradicate poverty and a data 
revolution to improve the quality of statistics available to citizens and governments. The United 
Nations (UN, 2014) and the International Telecommunications Union (UTI, 2018) also reported the 
huge and growing inequalities in access to data, information, and the ability to use it in a world where 
data is ‘the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability’. Although focusing 
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on poverty and development and not on the whole second, or digital, economy, the United Nations 
(UN, 2014) set out the main opportunities and risks presented by the data revolution and warned that 
information gaps between the private and public sectors can widen abuses of human rights. 
Investors with partnerships and the ability to finance data holders may have inside 
information about the whole economy. This may be the case for hedge funds operating in markets 
around the world and employing AI models fed with as much data as possible. These companies 
treasure BD, AI, and human intelligence. They recruit and retain very talented scientific staff who 
have to sign very stringent iron-clad non-competition and non-disclosure agreements. BD and AI 
know-how has recently been used in electoral campaigns. The intensive use of paid social media 
marketing may have influenced several political processes in a decisive way (Grassegger. and 
Krogerus 2017; Kosinski et al, 2013; Cadwalladr, 2017), with voter targeting decisions at least partly 
based on BD and AI insights. The same agents behind the electoral democratic process and the stock 
exchange may generate a situation that resembles the separation of powers problem (Kee 2018). The 
situation seems even more worrying if it is occurring within a black box. This lack of separation may 
increase the redistribution of wealth towards data holders. 
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6. Policy option for merit, Pareto efficient and non-rival uses of data: a data 
authority 
In the context of digitalisation, how can the public sector continue playing its role of responding to 
market failures and inefficiencies and promoting macroeconomic stability, growth, and equity? 
According to the traditional approach, and not including the role of data and focusing only on 
traditional flows in the economy, digitalisation decreases the ability of governments to collect taxes 
(T↓) (D’Andria, forthcoming). As a result, the economy will tend to regain equilibrium at the expense 
of government spending (G↓). At the same time, the ability of data holders to collect fees and 
monetise the value of data and their financial power facilitate their investment (I↑) and their expansion 
into other sectors, even those traditionally publicly funded such as health, education, and public 
transport. This implies that the role of the state in the economy is, in general, lower. 
S + T↓ + M = I↑ + G↓ + X (4) 
Existing policy actions build on this view of the economy and focus on fostering monetary 
taxation of digital activities (D’Andria, forthcoming; European Commission, 2018b; Pratley, 2018; 
Sandle, 2018; Khan and Brunsden, 2018; Munoz de Bustillo, 2019) or fines (Onfro and Browne 2018) 
to balance the equilibrium in equation 4 without the need to reduce government expenditure (G↓). This 
approach, although probably necessary to guarantee that the state continues playing a role in the digital 
economy, leaves the public sector displaced and outside the black box and BD knowledge 
extraction. It does not solve data underutilisation or information asymmetries, and does not offer any 
potential for merit uses of data. The state continues to play its role in the economy without taking into 
account data and knowledge flows. 
Several alternatives have started to appear in the literature. Posner and Weyl (2018) propose 
that agents could be compensated by the data they generate just as they are compensated for their 
labour or in the form of a dividend (Ulloa, 2019). Such compensation still has a ‘monetary’ view of 
the economy and does not take into account difficulties in pricing data and therefore the amount of 
compensation. Alternatively, Jones and Tonetti (2019) propose giving data property rights to 
consumers. However, individual data is almost valueless (Steel et al., 2013) as only having hundreds 
of millions adds value to data (Worstall, 2017), and the value of data is only realised after extracting 
knowledge from it. Jones and Tonetti’s (2019) proposal could be accompanied by tools and 
infrastructure that enable citizens to benefit from the positive externalities of data aggregation and 
knowledge extraction. This leads to the idea of the data authority, as proposed by Martens (2016) and 
more recently by Scott Morton et al. (2019). Incorporating leakages and injections into the 
semicircular flow of the economy leads to a similar proposal (Figure 7). A leakage in a data-intensive 
economy would be a flow of data to a data authority able to generate injections of knowledge on 
market failures, consumer rights, market structures, inefficiencies, macroeconomic stability, growth, 
and equity without damaging privacy. Public intervention in the semicircular flow of the economy 
should aim to achieve the optimal degree of knowledge extraction from data and avoid under-
consumption of data as a merit good while reducing, regulating, or banning demerit uses. 
Therefore, fostering merit uses of data could be achieved by two approaches: one based on the 
state’s monopoly of power, the other based on data ownership by individuals. The first approach could 
be executed through data taxation, which would generate a data flow to a data authority that would 
coordinate knowledge generation. Data taxation (data T) would be the leakage from data holders to the 
government sector responsible for fulfilling the goal of the governments. The injection would be the 
welfare knowledge transfers to the community (knowledge  G) to promote efficiency, equality, 
stability, and law enforcement (Figure 7). The second approach would imply that the data flow would 
go first to individuals, acknowledging that the personal data of an individual is their own property. 
This option would, in principle, generate less knowledge because data aggregation generates positive 
externalities that only large data aggregators with large computing machines can capture, taking 
marginal productivity away from individuals. In order to resolve this, individuals could decide 
whether or not to share data with the data authority. On the one hand, companies in general probably 
prefer to negotiate access with only one agent, an authority, rather than with individuals on a case-by-
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case basis. On the other hand, treating data as the property of an individual would be more socially 
acceptable and less likely to prompt privacy, surveillance, and ‘big brother’-type concerns. 
Both approaches are in line with the GDPR’s (European Commission, 2016) extensive view of 
data portability (31) (De Hert et al., 2018) according to which data can be transferred from one 
controller to another. In the second approach, transfers to a data authority could be based on the 
consent of an individual (32). In the first approach, it would be the role of the corresponding public 
authority (33), which would go beyond data protection and towards competition law and consumer 
protection (De Hert et al., 2018). 
Figure 7. Semicircular flow of the economy, leakages, and injections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In any event, data policy should be accompanied by a coordinated infrastructure, a 
centralised scientific authority big enough to benefit from scale and scope in knowledge extraction and 
benefit individuals through positive externalities of aggregation. Policy reactions have so far not been 
coordinated, centralised, or carefully designed. Access to data and algorithms are limited and mainly 
based on individual, case specific agreements (Pawelke and Tatevossian, 2013; Einav and Levin 2013, 
Barzic et al. 2018, Connolly, 2016; Scott and Young, 2018; Taylor et al., 2014; Prewitt, 2013). 
Any government intervention has to be merit, Pareto efficient, and non-rival. Generating 
knowledge flow should foster better regulations, standards, transparency, and maximise the common 
good (European Commission, 2017), working out information asymmetries and natural monopoly 
dynamics, aiming to achieve a well-informed society but avoid privacy and data protection issues and 
                                           
(31) European Union (2016), Art. 20. 
(32) European Union (2016), Art. 7. 
(33) European Union (2016), Art 51. 
Pure and mixed data generation markers 
 
Product market and factor market 
 
  
 
 
BLACK BOX 
 
 
 
 
BD knowledge extraction market 
 
Data taxation (T) and governmental data authority 
(knowledge injection, Knowledge G)  
Pareto-efficient, merit and non-rival policies 
 
B
D
 an
d
 A
I le
akage
 
K
n
o
w
le
d
ge
 In
je
ct
io
n
 
Data holders 
Marketing, advertising, search, and 
matching cost reduction, new services, 
information asymmetries, etc. 
Data 
and payments 
 
31 
free-riding behaviour by the  competitors of data holders. Merit and non-rival agents are organisations 
such as central banks, anti-trust and consumer rights authorities, the scientific community, and other 
agents who are not are not data holder competitors. Central banks could improve their forecasting of 
the economic cycle to deliver faster and nimbler policies. Anti-trust and consumer rights authorities 
could trigger research on sources of market failures, deliver better anti-trust policies, and balance 
information asymmetries. The scientific community could change the scale and scope of knowledge 
about a great many research topics and phenomena (Schroeder and Cowls, 2014). New scientific 
evidence, conceptualisations, and theories would develop theoretical-empirical synergies that would 
disentangle the reality behind the black box. Merit knowledge generation from data would have 
spillover effects on the whole of society, including data holders. Either data taxation or treating data as 
the property of individuals with an infrastructure would be Pareto efficient because it would improve 
the situation of agents who are the beneficiaries of the intervention, mainly households and firms, 
without generating negative consequences for efficient allocation of resources. It would also avoid 
problems emerging that are already solved by the current de facto ownership (e.g., incentives to 
innovate, free rider problems, and the tragedy of commons). 
A very sensitive issue in such a data policy would be privacy. Any data policy should be 
implemented in accordance with existing regulation such as the GDPR. The data authority would be in 
charge of coordinating merit access to data and avoiding privacy issues. Facilitating data access under 
non-disclosure agreements to merit and non-rival agents is just an additional tool to grant privacy and 
other citizens and consumer rights and to fulfil the requirements of the GDPR. This is in line with the 
extensive user-centric view of data portability (De Hert et al., 2018). The explanation above assumes 
that technology and careful regulation can protect privacy and allow additional generation of 
knowledge without raising concerns about privacy.  
There are a number of decisions and regulations that a data policy would need. To name but a 
few: revisit the NACE classification to include knowledge extraction from BD as a specific activity, 
develop professional deontological codes for merit users, and run communication campaigns and 
provide education to inform the public about the differences between the role of a data authority and 
activities that endanger privacy such as surveillance, ‘spying on citizens’, and ‘big brother’-type 
proposals. The data authority would have to be clearly set apart from former scandals such as the 
disclosure of the US National Security Agency’s mass surveillance and the public outcry following 
data releases. 
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7. Conclusions 
The semicircular flow of the economy represents the major exchanges of the digital economy. Data 
flows from firms and households towards data holders. Flows of processed knowledge and 
information go back to economic agents in the form of ‘algorithmic’ services. The activity of 
extracting knowledge from data by means of AI displays natural monopoly characteristics that cast 
doubt on whether the quantity of knowledge generated is below the perfect competition/socially 
optimal amount. Knowledge extraction occurs within a black box that produces the amount of 
knowledge that maximises data holders’ profits, causing information asymmetries and inequalities in 
access to data. There is a lack of transparency and empirical evidences on how the digital economy 
works. Merit uses of data could activate knowledge flows and shed light on whether government 
should play a role. Existing regulation in Europe is intended to facilitate the free flow of data within 
the EU to protect the rights of citizens. The semicircular flow model supports the development of user-
centric regulations, data portability, data taxation, and a data authority. 
Traditionally, if a monopoly led to higher prices and lower output (lower generation of 
knowledge), governments would intervene, and if it implied an unfair distribution of wealth (and 
knowledge and information), the state would implement redistribution policies. Nowadays fiscal and 
monetary policies are unable to disentangle what happens inside the black box and the consequences 
for the economy. The semicircular flow defines new flows from which new leakages and knowledge 
injections can be defined. It motivates the development of a data policy able to work in that direction. 
It sheds light on how additional regulation could build on GDPR’s portability and free flow of data. 
Breaking up monopolies may generate inefficiencies arising from duplication of resources. 
The economic characterisation of data identifies dysfunctions and possible solutions and where 
intervention could display positive externalities without reducing efficiency. Data characterisation 
supports further clarity in the de facto ownership of data holders by distinguishing between data use 
(by data holders and merit users) and data property rights (of consumers). On the one hand, clear 
rights should maintain data holders’ incentives to invest and the efficiencies that emerge from positive 
externalities of aggregation and avoid free riding, overutilisation, and the tragedy of commons that 
would damage data generation markets. On the other hand, allowing additional merit uses of data 
should increase the amount of knowledge generated, transparency, and market efficiency. Exploring 
the information asymmetries between data holders and the rest of the agents in the economy helps to 
identify underutilisation and uses that would allow policy measures to eliminate market failures 
without generating new ones. 
Data policy should also aim to increase the amount of knowledge generated by studying data 
and algorithms in the ‘black box’ to enable governments to play their role in the digital economy: 
responding to market failures, macroeconomic stability, inefficient growth, and equity. Merit 
uses would support consumer and anti-trust authorities, central banks, data protection agencies, and 
the scientific community. Arguments, such as scale and scope and access to data, support a centralised 
data authority with enough infrastructure and resources. 
The main contribution of the semicircular flow of the economy is to facilitate a simple 
economic theoretical motivation for access to and portability of data for the public good. Many 
questions for future research emerge. They range from new theories and empirical evidence to policy 
actions. A data policy should foster interaction between science and policy to reinforce each other. 
Future research by the authors will focus on identifying the optimum degree of data utilisation and 
optimum data taxation and the micro foundations of the semicircular flow of the economy. 
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